Arbeitspapier
What drives motivated agents? The "right" mission or sharing it with the principal
Motivated agents are characterized by increasing their effort if their work generates not only a monetary return for them but also a benefit for a mission they support. While their motivation may stem from working for their preferred (i.e., the `right') mission, it may also be the principal's choice of the right mission (i.e., a mission preference match) that motivates them. We investigate experimentally to what extent these two motivations are driving the effect of a mission on agent effort. We find that agents care not only about the mission as such but also whether the principal shares this mission. Our analysis estimates the additional effect of a mission preference match to be as big as the effect of just working for the right mission. It seems that the full potential of `motivation by mission' is realized only when principals share as well as support the agents' mission, stressing the importance of the economics of identity in labor market settings.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2015-022
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Labor Economics: General
Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Subject
-
corporate social responsibility
experiment
identity
incentives
labor market
mission
motivated agents
principal agent
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Koppel, Hannes
Regner, Tobias
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena
- (where)
-
Jena
- (when)
-
2015
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Koppel, Hannes
- Regner, Tobias
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena
Time of origin
- 2015
Other Objects (12)
Efficiency Wages with Motivated Agents
Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force
Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force
The role of implicit motives in strategic decision-making: Computational models of motivated learning and the evolution of motivated agents
Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint
Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint
Principal’s distributive preferences and the incentivization of agents
Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods
Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods
Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods
Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods
Intrinsically motivated agents for goal discovery in high dimensional state spaces
Efficiency Wages with Motivated Agents
Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force
Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force
The role of implicit motives in strategic decision-making: Computational models of motivated learning and the evolution of motivated agents
Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint
Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint
Principal’s distributive preferences and the incentivization of agents
Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods
Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods
Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods
Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods
Intrinsically motivated agents for goal discovery in high dimensional state spaces
Efficiency Wages with Motivated Agents
Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force
Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force
The role of implicit motives in strategic decision-making: Computational models of motivated learning and the evolution of motivated agents
Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint
Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint
Principal’s distributive preferences and the incentivization of agents
Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods
Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods
Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods
Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods