Arbeitspapier
Cursed consumers and the effectiveness of consumer protection policies
We model firms' quality disclosure and pricing in the presence of cursed consumers, who fail to be sufficiently skeptical about undisclosed quality. We show that cursed consumers are exploited in duopoly markets if firms are vertically differentiated, if there are few cursed consumers, and if average product quality is high. Three common consumer protection policies that work under monopoly, i.e. mandatory disclosure, third party disclosure and consumer education, may all increase exploitation and decrease welfare. Even where these policies improve overall welfare, they often lead to a reduction in consumer surplus. We show that our conclusions hold in extensions with endogenous quality choice and horizontal differentiation.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 305
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
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naive
cursed
disclosure
consumer protection
labeling
competition
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ispano, Alessandro
Schwardmann, Peter
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (wo)
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München und Berlin
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ispano, Alessandro
- Schwardmann, Peter
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Entstanden
- 2022