Arbeitspapier
Employee Types and Endogenous Organizational Design
When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-effective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and monitoring. This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment designed to test whether organizations make full effective use of the available preference types within their work force when drafting their organizational design. Our main finding is that they do not do so; although the importance of social preferences is recognized by those choosing the organizational mode, the significant impact managers' preferences have on the behavior of workers in the organization seems to be overlooked.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 08-019/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Particular Labor Markets: General
Personnel Economics: General
- Subject
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Organizational design
social preference types
experiments
Organisationsstruktur
Humanressourcen
Verhalten in Organisationen
Test
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Cunyat, Antoni
Sloof, Randolph
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cunyat, Antoni
- Sloof, Randolph
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2008
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