Arbeitspapier

Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?

We study the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI) and derive social-optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) DI eligibility rules and (ii) DI benefits. Causal evidence from two DI reforms in Austria generate fiscal multipliers (total over mechanical cost reductions) of 2.0-2.5 for stricter DI eligibility rules and of 1.3-1.4 for lower DI benefits. Stricter DI eligibility rules generate lower income losses (earnings + transfers), particularly at the lower end of the income distribution. Hence, to roll back the Austrian DI program, policy makers should implement tighter DI eligibility rules rather than lower DI benefits. An application of our framework to the DI system of the U.S. suggests that DI eligibility rules are too strict and DI benefits are too low.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13539

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
Social Security and Public Pensions
Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination
Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Thema
disability insurance
screening
benefits
policy reform

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Haller, Andreas
Staubli, Stefan
Zweimüller, Josef
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Haller, Andreas
  • Staubli, Stefan
  • Zweimüller, Josef
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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