Where Did It Go Wrong? Marriage and Divorce in Malawi

Arbeitspapier

Do individuals divorce for economic reasons? Can we measure the attractiveness of new matches in the marriage market? We answer these questions using a structural model of the household and a rich panel dataset from Malawi. We propose a model of the household with consumption, production and revealed preference conditions for stability on the marriage market. We define marital instability in terms of the consumption gains to remarrying another individual in the same marriage market, and to being single. We find that a 1 percentage point increase in the wife's estimated consumption gains from remarriage is significantly associated with a 0:6 percentage point increase in divorce probability in the next three years. In a multinomial model, higher values of consumption gains from remarriage raise the odds of divorce and remarriage but not of divorce and singleness. These findings provide out-of-sample validation of the structural model and shed new light on the economic determinants of divorce.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 9843

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Consumer Economics: Theory ; Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis ; Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation ; Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
• Thema: marriage market ; divorce ; Malawi ; agricultural production ; revealed preference

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Cherchye, Laurens ; De Rock, Bram ; Telalagic Walther, Selma ; Vermeulen, Frederic
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/141602
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ