Arbeitspapier
Identifying the reasons for coordination failure in a laboratory experiment
We investigate the effect of absence of common knowledge on the outcomes of coordination games in a laboratory experiment. Using cognitive types, we can explain coordination failure in pure coordination games while differentiating between coordination failure due to first- and higher-order beliefs. In our experiment, around 76% of the subjects have chosen the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy despite the absence of common knowledge. However, 9% of the players had first-order beliefs that lead to coordination failure and another 9% exhibited coordination failure due to higher-order beliefs. Furthermore, we compare our results with predictions of commonly used models of higher-order beliefs.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 567
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
Higher-order beliefs
coordination failure
cognitive abilities
experimental economics
game theory
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Külpmann, Philipp
Khantadze, Davit
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-29058652
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Külpmann, Philipp
- Khantadze, Davit
- Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Entstanden
- 2016