Arbeitspapier

Identifying the reasons for coordination failure in a laboratory experiment

We investigate the effect of absence of common knowledge on the outcomes of coordination games in a laboratory experiment. Using cognitive types, we can explain coordination failure in pure coordination games while differentiating between coordination failure due to first- and higher-order beliefs. In our experiment, around 76% of the subjects have chosen the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy despite the absence of common knowledge. However, 9% of the players had first-order beliefs that lead to coordination failure and another 9% exhibited coordination failure due to higher-order beliefs. Furthermore, we compare our results with predictions of commonly used models of higher-order beliefs.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 567

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Higher-order beliefs
coordination failure
cognitive abilities
experimental economics
game theory

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Külpmann, Philipp
Khantadze, Davit
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
(wo)
Bielefeld
(wann)
2016

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-29058652
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Külpmann, Philipp
  • Khantadze, Davit
  • Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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