Arbeitspapier

Politicians' promotion incentives and bank risk exposure in China

This paper shows that politicians' pressure to climb the career ladder increases bank risk exposure in their region. Chinese local politicians are set growth targets in their region that are relative to each other. Growth is stimulated by debt-financed programs which are mainly financed via bank loans. The stronger the performance incentive the riskier the respective local bank exposure becomes. This effect holds primarily for local banks which are under a certain degree of control of local politicians and it has increased with the release of recent stimulus packages requiring local co-financing.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series ; No. 216

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
State and Local Borrowing
Thema
Bank Lending
Bank Risk Exposure
Local Politicians
Promotion Incentives

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Wang, Li
Menkhoff, Lukas
Schröder, Michael
Xu, Xian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Wang, Li
  • Menkhoff, Lukas
  • Schröder, Michael
  • Xu, Xian
  • Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

Entstanden

  • 2015

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