Arbeitspapier
Politicians' promotion incentives and bank risk exposure in China
This paper shows that politicians' pressure to climb the career ladder increases bank risk exposure in their region. Chinese local politicians are set growth targets in their region that are relative to each other. Growth is stimulated by debt-financed programs which are mainly financed via bank loans. The stronger the performance incentive the riskier the respective local bank exposure becomes. This effect holds primarily for local banks which are under a certain degree of control of local politicians and it has increased with the release of recent stimulus packages requiring local co-financing.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series ; No. 216
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
State and Local Borrowing
- Thema
-
Bank Lending
Bank Risk Exposure
Local Politicians
Promotion Incentives
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Wang, Li
Menkhoff, Lukas
Schröder, Michael
Xu, Xian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Wang, Li
- Menkhoff, Lukas
- Schröder, Michael
- Xu, Xian
- Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Entstanden
- 2015