Arbeitspapier

Politicians' promotion incentives and bank risk exposure in China

This paper shows that politicians' pressure to climb the career ladder increases bank risk exposure in their region. Chinese local politicians are set growth targets in their region that are relative to each other. Growth is stimulated by debt-financed programs which are mainly financed via bank loans. The stronger the performance incentive the riskier the respective local bank exposure becomes. This effect holds primarily for local banks which are under a certain degree of control of local politicians and it has increased with the release of recent stimulus packages requiring local co-financing.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series ; No. 216

Classification
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
State and Local Borrowing
Subject
Bank Lending
Bank Risk Exposure
Local Politicians
Promotion Incentives

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Wang, Li
Menkhoff, Lukas
Schröder, Michael
Xu, Xian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Wang, Li
  • Menkhoff, Lukas
  • Schröder, Michael
  • Xu, Xian
  • Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

Time of origin

  • 2015

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