Corporate Governance and Pension Fund Performance

Artikel

This study provides new evidence on the impact of governance on the performance of privately defined contribution pension plans. Using a hand collected data set on governance factors, the study shows that the external and internal governance mechanisms in pension plans are weak. One explanation for this weakness is the potential conflict between the pension beneficiaries and the fund's owner, which depends on who bears the investment risk in the pension plan. Hence, different governance factors are found to be important for pension fund return on invested assets and also for its economic performance. Consequently, the overall policy conclusion is that more focus should be put on the governance of the pension funds, taking into account the different interests of the beneficiaries and owners as it may determine their performance.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Contemporary Economics ; ISSN: 2084-0845 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2012 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 14-44 ; Warsaw: Vizja Press & IT

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors ; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation ; Corporate Finance and Governance: General
• Subject: pension funds ; corporate governance ; agency theory ; performance

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kowalewski, Oskar
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Vizja Press & IT
• (where): Warsaw
• (when): 2012

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5709/ce.1897-9254.32
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105376
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET