The political economy of EC protectionism: National protectionism based on art. 115, treaty of Rome

Arbeitspapier

In this paper, I will explain the role of Art. 115 ToR (Treaty of Rome). Art. 115 serves mainly bureaucratic interests and domestic interests to obtain protection. The decision-making process suggests a mixed system of administered protection and influences from the political market. Protection results from a rather complex interdependence of bureaucracy, politicians and interest groups. Correspondingly, the level of protection depends on the economic situation as well as the institutional setting and its changes. Looking at the structure of 115-protection, it is noticeable that textile and clothing manufacturers are the principal "clients". While Art. 115 accomodates specific protectionist interests of the textile/clothing sector it provides "low key" protection to other manufacturers. Finally, an empirical study will provide some support of the main hypothesis.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; No. 81

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schuknecht, Ludger
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
• (where): Konstanz
• (when): 1989

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101600
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET