Arbeitspapier

Prospects after the Voting Reform of the Lisbon Treaty

The European Union used to make decisions by unanimity or near unanimity. After a series of extensions, with 27 member states the present decision making mechanisms have become very slow and assigned power to the members in an arbitrary way. The new decision rules accepted as part of the Lisbon Treaty did not only make decision making far easier, but streamlined the process by removing the most controversial element: the voting weights. The new system relies entirely on population data. We look at the immediate impact of the reform as well as the long term effects of the dfferent demographic trends in the 27 member states. We find that the Lisbon rules benefit the largest member states, while medium sized countries, especially Central Eastern European countries suffer the biggest losses.

ISBN
978-615-5024-11-5
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2010/20

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
European Union
Council of Ministers
qualified majority voting
Banzhaf index
Shapley-Shubik index
a priori voting power
demographics
Abstimmung
Reform
Abstimmungsregel
EU-Staaten

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kóczy, László Á.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
(wo)
Budapest
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kóczy, László Á.
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2010

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