Investment in Relationship-Specific Assets: Does Finance Matter?

Arbeitspapier

Existing literature highlights opportunistic behavior as the main reason why rational agents underinvest in relationship-specific assets (the hold-up problem). However, a supplier would also be reluctant to undertake relationship-specific investment if she cannot observe financial stability or planning horizon of a buyer. By combining insights from research on relationship-specific investment and signaling role of financial intermediaries, we argue that a strong banking sector can alleviate these information asymmetries between buyers and suppliers. We empirically confirm this hypothesis by showing that industries dependent on relationship-specific investment from their suppliers grow disproportionately faster in countries with a strong banking sector.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2013:11

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance ; Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity: General
• Thema: …nancial development ; relationship-speci…c investment ; growth

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Strieborny, Martin ; Kukenova, Madina
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (wo): Lund
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/260069
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ