Arbeitspapier

Whom to Send to Doha? The Shortsighted Ones!

Why are empirically observed tariffs so much lower than theoretically calculated Nash-equilibrium tariffs? We argue that this gap can be narrowed by using a dynamic model instead of a static model. This approach has two advantages. (i) It allows us to take account of the transitional process after a change in tariffs. (ii) It allows us to take account of the shortsightedness of policy makers. We show that Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a dynamic trade model are lower than Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a static model. We also show that shortsighted politicians tend to set lower tariffs than politicians with a long planning horizon.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1695

Classification
Wirtschaft
Neoclassical Models of Trade
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Subject
Bubbles
fiscal theory of the price level
collateral constraints
neutrality
transversality conditions
Zolltheorie
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Zollpolitik

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Larch, Mario
Lechthaler, Wolfgang
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
(where)
Kiel
(when)
2011

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Larch, Mario
  • Lechthaler, Wolfgang
  • Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Time of origin

  • 2011

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