Arbeitspapier
Whom to Send to Doha? The Shortsighted Ones!
Why are empirically observed tariffs so much lower than theoretically calculated Nash-equilibrium tariffs? We argue that this gap can be narrowed by using a dynamic model instead of a static model. This approach has two advantages. (i) It allows us to take account of the transitional process after a change in tariffs. (ii) It allows us to take account of the shortsightedness of policy makers. We show that Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a dynamic trade model are lower than Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a static model. We also show that shortsighted politicians tend to set lower tariffs than politicians with a long planning horizon.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1695
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Neoclassical Models of Trade
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- Thema
-
Bubbles
fiscal theory of the price level
collateral constraints
neutrality
transversality conditions
Zolltheorie
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Zollpolitik
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Larch, Mario
Lechthaler, Wolfgang
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Larch, Mario
- Lechthaler, Wolfgang
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Entstanden
- 2011