Is unemployment always higher when insiders decide?

Arbeitspapier

This paper challenges the traditional view that unemployment is high because insiders determine the union wage. The insiders in this paper are characterized by being more efficient when they search for a job than the outsiders, implying that they experience relatively less unemployment. We assume that wages are determined by a monopoly union and further that a union leader is elected by a majority voting rule. Insiders may prefer a lower wage than outsiders, implying the possibility of lower unemployment.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working paper ; No. 13-2000

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Demand and Supply of Labor: General ; Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General ; Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers: General
• Thema: Insiders and Outsiders ; Search ; Unemployment

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Filges, Trine ; Larsen, Birthe
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
• (wo): Frederiksberg
• (wann): 2000

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/208435
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ