Arbeitspapier
Socially Optimal Royalty Design and Illegal Logging under Alternative Penalty Schemes
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1131
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
illegal logging
royalty design
penalty schemes
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Amacher, Gregory S.
Koskela, Erkki
Ollikainen, Markku
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Amacher, Gregory S.
- Koskela, Erkki
- Ollikainen, Markku
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2004
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