Arbeitspapier
Financing Public Capital through Land Rent Taxation: A Macroeconomic Henry George Theorem
Financing productive public capital through distortionary taxes typically creates a trade-off: the optimal investment is determined as a compromise between efficiency-enhancing public investment and perturbing market efficiency, but is never socially optimal. In contrast, such a trade-off can often be avoided if public capital is financed by taxing rents of a fixed production factor, such as land. Here, we provide a macroeconomic version of the Henry George Theorem. Specifically, we prove that the socially optimal level of the public capital stock can be reached by a land rent tax, provided land is a more important production factor than public capital.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4280
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Publicly Provided Goods: General
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Land
- Thema
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land rent tax
public investment
Henry George Theorem
social optimum
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Mattauch, Linus
Siegmeier, Jan
Edenhofer, Ottmar
Creutzig, Felix
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Mattauch, Linus
- Siegmeier, Jan
- Edenhofer, Ottmar
- Creutzig, Felix
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2013