Arbeitspapier

Financing Public Capital through Land Rent Taxation: A Macroeconomic Henry George Theorem

Financing productive public capital through distortionary taxes typically creates a trade-off: the optimal investment is determined as a compromise between efficiency-enhancing public investment and perturbing market efficiency, but is never socially optimal. In contrast, such a trade-off can often be avoided if public capital is financed by taxing rents of a fixed production factor, such as land. Here, we provide a macroeconomic version of the Henry George Theorem. Specifically, we prove that the socially optimal level of the public capital stock can be reached by a land rent tax, provided land is a more important production factor than public capital.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4280

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Publicly Provided Goods: General
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Land
Thema
land rent tax
public investment
Henry George Theorem
social optimum

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mattauch, Linus
Siegmeier, Jan
Edenhofer, Ottmar
Creutzig, Felix
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mattauch, Linus
  • Siegmeier, Jan
  • Edenhofer, Ottmar
  • Creutzig, Felix
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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