Arbeitspapier
Hypergeorgism: When is Rent Taxation as a Remedy for Insufficient Capital Accumulation Socially Optimal?
Imperfect altruism between generations may lead to insufficient capital accumulation. We study the welfare consequences of taxing the rent on a fixed production factor, such as land, in this setting. We prove that taxing the rent is welfare-enhancing as it increases capital investment. This holds for any tax level and any recycling of the tax revenues except for combinations of high taxes and strongly redistributive recycling. Specific forms of redistribution of the land rent tax - a capital subsidy or a transfer directed at fundless newborns - allow to reproduce the social optimum under parameter restrictions valid for most economies.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4144
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Land
- Subject
-
land rent tax
overlapping generations
revenue recycling
social optimum
underaccumulation
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Edenhofer, Ottmar
Mattauch, Linus
Siegmeier, Jan
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2013
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Edenhofer, Ottmar
- Mattauch, Linus
- Siegmeier, Jan
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2013
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