Delay determinants of European Banking Union implementation

Arbeitspapier

To safeguard financial stability and harmonise regulation, the European Commission substantially reformed banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance via EU directives. But most countries delay the transposition of these directives. We ask if transposition delays result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems? Supervisors might try to protect national banking systems and local politicians maybe reluctant to surrender national sovereignty to deal with failed banks. Alternatively, intricate financial regulation might require more implementation time in large and complex financial and political systems. We therefore collect data on the transposition delays of the three Banking Union directives and investigate observed delay variation across member states. Our correlation analyses suggest that existing regulatory and institutional frameworks, rather than banking market structure or political factors, matter for transposition delays.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IWH Discussion Papers ; No. 24/2017

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies ; International Finance: General ; International Institutional Arrangements ; International Financial Markets ; General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
• Subject: single rulebook ; political economy ; transposition delays

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Koetter, Michael ; Krause, Thomas ; Tonzer, Lena
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
• (where): Halle (Saale)
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/172266
• URN: urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-81552
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET