Social Norms and the Evolution of Conditional Cooperation

Arbeitspapier

This paper develops a model of social norms and cooperation in large societies. Within this framework we use an indirect evolutionary approach to study the endogenous formation of preferences and the coevolution of norm compliance. Thereby we link the multiplicity of equilibria, which emerges in the presence of social norms, to the evolutionary analysis: Individuals face situations where many others cooperate as well as situations where a majority free-rides. The evolutionary adaptation to such heterogenous environments will favor conditional cooperators, who condition their pro-social behavior on the others' cooperation. As conditional cooperators react flexibly to their social environment, they dominate free-riders as well as unconditional cooperators.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2007-12

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
• Thema: Conditional Cooperation ; Indirect Evolution ; Social Norms ; Heterogenous Environments ; Soziale Norm ; Soziales Verhalten ; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Spichtig, Mathias ; Traxler, Christian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.1398
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104225
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-1398-0
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ