Arbeitspapier

Market structure and risk taking in the banking industry

This study demonstrates that the common view, whereby an increase in competition leads banks to increased risk taking, fails to hold in an environment where consumers can choose in which bank to make a deposit based on their knowledge of the riskiness incorporated in the banks' outstanding loan portfolios.We show that, in the absence of deposit insurance, competition between differentiated banks will increase the returns from diversification.We offer a welfare analysis establishing that introduction of competition into the banking industry can only improve social welfare.However, competition cannot always guarantee that diversification will occur to a socially optimal extent.Finally, we show that deposit insurance would eliminate the beneficial effects of banks competing with asset quality as a strategic instrument.

ISBN
951-686-592-5
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Finland Discussion Papers ; No. 22/1998

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Risk taking in banking
banks' portfolio diversification
bank competition
deposit insurance

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Shy, Oz
Stenbacka, Rune
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
1998

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Shy, Oz
  • Stenbacka, Rune
  • Bank of Finland

Entstanden

  • 1998

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