Capital mobility, tax competition, and lobbying for redistributive capital taxation

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the impact of international capital mobility on redistributive capital taxation and on lobbying activities by interest groups. It employs a model where different capital endowments lead to a conflict between households concerning their most preferred capital tax rate. Three main results are derived: First, redistributive source based capital taxes or subsidies decline as international tax competition intensifies. Second, lobbying activities of certain interest groups may explain international differences in the capital tax rate. Third, capital mobility may lead to declining lobbying activities of interest groups and thus may be welfare increasing for all households.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Year: 1996 ; Kiel: Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; International Policy Coordination and Transmission ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
• Thema: Tax competition ; interest groups ; redistribution

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Lorz, Jens Oliver
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW) ; ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (wo): Kiel
• (wann): 1996

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47109
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ