Artikel

The equilibrium results analysis in a competing supply chains with consumer returns

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is, to examine the optimal pricing and ordering strategy of two competing chains with customer returns in Bertrand-Nash game and Stackelberg game, and to investigate in what cases the manufacturer can make more profits from customer returns policy. Design/methodology/approach: We build the customer returns model in the competing chains and compare the equilibrium results in Bertrand-Nash game with that in Stackelberg game. Findings: The main contribution of the present study is the manufacturer can benefit from customer returns policy, only if customer return rate is sufficiently low in two games. In addition, the optimal price, order quantity and profits in Stackelberg game are affected more seriously by customer returns than that in Bertrand-Nash game. Originality/value: The impact of customer returns on the competing chain is initially considered, where the demand is related with the retail price and return price.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management (JIEM) ; ISSN: 2013-0953 ; Volume: 6 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 149-162 ; Barcelona: OmniaScience

Klassifikation
Management
Thema
competing supply chain
consumer returns
Bertrand-Nash game
Stackelberg game

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Liu, Jian
Wang, Haiyan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
OmniaScience
(wo)
Barcelona
(wann)
2013

DOI
doi:10.3926/jiem.601
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Liu, Jian
  • Wang, Haiyan
  • OmniaScience

Entstanden

  • 2013

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