Arbeitspapier

Option Values in Sequential Markets

We consider competitive behaviour in sequential markets when current success or failure may affect the probability of future market opportunities. The analysis is conducted in a set up which may be interpreted as two private-value, sealed-bid, second-price sequential auctions. We demonstrate that whether agents price higher or lower than in the corresponding static context depends on the relative magnitudes of the 'winner's option value' and the 'loser's option value' of participating in the later market.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Memorandum ; No. 07/1998

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Auctions
Subject
auctions

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
von der Fehr, N.-H. M.
Riis, C.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(where)
Oslo
(when)
1998

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • von der Fehr, N.-H. M.
  • Riis, C.
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 1998

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