Artikel

Family firm research: A review

This article reviews family firm studies in the finance and accounting literature, primarily those conducted using data from the United States and China. Family owners have unique features such as concentrated ownership, long investment horizon, and reputation concerns. Given the distinguishing features of family ownership and control, family firms face unique agency conflicts. We discuss the agency problems in family firms and review the findings of recent family firm studies. We call for more research to understand the unique family effects and encourage more research on Chinese family firms.Part I of the article discusses the fundaments of family firms: the prevalence of and the agency conflicts within family firms. Part II summarizes the findings of recent U.S. family firm studies. It reviews the evidence on the family firm premium (how, which, and when family firms are associated with a valuation premium), the manifestation of the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders in family firms, earnings quality and corporate disclosure, and the determinants of family ownership and control. Part III discusses the prevalence and characteristics of Chinese family firms and reviews the findings of related studies. The article concludes with some suggestions for future research.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: China Journal of Accounting Research ; ISSN: 1755-3091 ; Volume: 7 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 149-163 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier

Klassifikation
Management
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
Business Economics: General
Accounting
Thema
Family firms
Ownership structure
Agency problems
Controlling owners
Minority owners

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cheng, Qiang
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Elsevier
(wo)
Amsterdam
(wann)
2014

DOI
doi:10.1016/j.cjar.2014.03.002
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Cheng, Qiang
  • Elsevier

Entstanden

  • 2014

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