Arbeitspapier

Transparency and numeric rules in the budgeting process: Theory and evidence

In this paper I develop a simple dynamic agency model postulating that, among budgetary institutions, transparency of the budgeting process is the main driving force in explaining differences in fiscal outcomes and that budgetary numeric rules can be an active long-run constraint only if the budgeting process is transparent enough. The model does not only account for long-run differences where countries with better budgetary institutions will have more disciplined fiscal outcomes, but can rationalize situations where countries with relatively better budgetary institutions can have what would appear to be less disciplined fiscal outcomes in the short-run. Empirical tests corroborate some but not all of the model's predictions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers ; No. 2008-13

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
National Budget; Budget Systems
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General
Thema
Budgetary Institutions
Fiscal Outcomes
Transparency
Öffentlicher Haushalt
Neue politische Ökonomie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Amoroso, Nicolás
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Banco de México
(wo)
Ciudad de México
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Amoroso, Nicolás
  • Banco de México

Entstanden

  • 2008

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