Arbeitspapier

The economics and empirics of tax competition: A survey

We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on local and international tax competition in Economics. Based on this survey, we discuss whether EU countries should harmonize tax policies to prevent a race to the bottom. Much of the evidence suggests that tax competition does not lead to significant reductions in tax revenues. Therefore, we conclude that tax coordination is in all likelihood unnecessary to prevent inefficiently low levels of taxation in the EU. But since the evidence against adverse effects of tax competition is not unambiguous, we also discuss whether intergovernmental transfers might be a less invasive means than outright tax harmonization to prevent a race to the bottom.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: cege Discussion Papers ; No. 163

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
International Relations and International Political Economy: Other
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Thema
Tax competition
Tax coordination
European Union
Fiscal federalism

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Baskaran, Thushyanthan
Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
(wo)
Göttingen
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Baskaran, Thushyanthan
  • Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana
  • University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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