Fiscal Transparency and Procyclical Fiscal Policy

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines why fiscal policy is procyclical in developing as well as developed countries. We introduce the concept of fiscal transparency into a model of retrospective voting, in which a political agency problem between voters and politicians generates a procyclical bias in government spending. The introduction of fiscal transparency generates two new predictions: 1) the procyclical bias in fiscal policy arises only in good times; and 2) a higher degree of fiscal transparency reduces the bias in good times. We find solid empirical support for both predictions using data on both OECD countries and a broader set of countries.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: EPRU Working Paper Series ; No. 2010-01

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Business Fluctuations; Cycles ; Fiscal Policy
• Thema: fiscal transparency ; fiscal policy ; procyclicality ; business cycle ; political economy ; Konjunktur ; Finanzpolitik ; Öffentliche Ausgaben ; Bias ; Wahlverhalten ; Theorie ; Entwicklungsländer ; Industriestaaten

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Andersen, Asger Lau ; Holbøll Westh Nielsen, Lasse
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
• (wo): Copenhagen
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82132
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ