Arbeitspapier
Dynamic stable set
We study a dynamic vNM stable set in a compact metric space under the assumption of complete and continuous dominance relation. Internal and external stability are defined with respect to farsighted dominance. Stability of an outcome is conditioned on the history via which it is reached. A dynamic stable set always exists. Any covering set by Dutta (1988) coincides with the set of outcomes that are implementable via a dynamic stable set. The maximal implementable outcome set is a version of the ultimate uncovered set.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 33
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
vNM stable set
dynamic
history
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Vartiainen, Hannu
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
- (wo)
-
Turku
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Vartiainen, Hannu
- Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Entstanden
- 2008
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