Fighting cartels: some economics of council regulation (EC) 1/2003

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates the effectiveness of the new Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 which replaces the mandatory notification and authorization system by a legal exception system. Effectiveness is operationalized via the two subcriteria compliance to Art. 81 EC Treaty and the probabilities of type I and type II errors committed by the European Commission. We identify four different types of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria: fullcompliance, zero-compliance, positive-compliance and full-deterrence. We show that the Commission can, in principle, hit the full-compliance equilibrium, where the cartelizing firms fully obey the requirements of Art 81(3) EC Treaty and both error probabilities are zero.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CSLE Discussion Paper ; No. 2008-02

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Antitrust Law ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
• Thema: competition law ; cartel law enforcement ; legal exception ; imperfect

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Will, Birgit E. ; Schmidtchen, Dieter
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
• (wo): Saarbrücken
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28014
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ