Unboxing ARX-Based White-Box Ciphers: Chosen-Plaintext Computation Analysis and Its Applications
Abstract: It has been proven that the white-box ciphers with small encodings will be vulnerable to algebraic and computation attacks. By leveraging the large encodings, the self-equivalence and implicit implementations are proposed for ARXbased white-box ciphers. Unfortunately, these two types of white-box implementations are proven to be insecure under the algebraic attack. Different from algebraic attacks, computation analysis can extract the secret key from the memory access traces without software reverse engineering. It is still an open problem whether the self-equivalence and implicit implementations can resist the computation analysis. In this paper, we analyze the encoded structure of the self-equivalence/implicit whitebox ARX ciphers and discuss its resistance to the computation analysis, such as differential computation analysis (DCA) and algebraic degree computation analysis (ADCA). The results reveal that the large input, encoding, and round key can practically mitigate DCA and A.... https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11690
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Unboxing ARX-Based White-Box Ciphers: Chosen-Plaintext Computation Analysis and Its Applications ; volume:2024 ; number:3 ; year:2024
IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems ; 2024, Heft 3 (2024)
- Urheber
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Tang, Yufeng
Gong, Zheng
Zhao, Liangju
Li, Di
Liu, Zhe
- DOI
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10.46586/tches.v2024.i3.634-670
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2407241854264.185298487690
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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14.08.2025, 10:50 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Beteiligte
- Tang, Yufeng
- Gong, Zheng
- Zhao, Liangju
- Li, Di
- Liu, Zhe