Arbeitspapier

Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

In this paper we are interested in efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by regrouping goods in her initial endowment. We present a suitable environment in which the existence of such rules can be analysed, and show the incompatibility of efficiency, individual rationality and regrouping-proofness even if agents' preferences are additive separable.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Papers ; No. 367

Classification
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Public Goods
Subject
Exchange markets
Indivisible goods
Regrouping-proofness

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dimitrov, Dinko
Haake, Claus-Jochen
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
(where)
Bielefeld
(when)
2005

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7321
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dimitrov, Dinko
  • Haake, Claus-Jochen
  • Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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