Observable implications of nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games

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In this paper we develop tests for whether play in a game is consistent with equilibrium behavior when preferences are unobserved. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect behavior but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither. Further, we discuss the relevance of the test outcomes for rationalization of data by multiple preference profiles.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2003-02

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Subject: Revealed Preference ; Consistency ; Subgame-Perfect ; Offenbarte Präferenzen ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Extensives Spiel

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ray, Indrajit ; Snyder, Susan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Brown University, Department of Economics
• (where): Providence, RI
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80116