A Dynamic Model of Predation

Arbeitspapier

We study the feasibility and profitability of predation in a parsimonious infinite-horizon, complete information setting where an incumbent may face an entrant, in which case it needs to decide whether to accommodate or predate it. If the entrant exits, a new entrant is born with positive probability. We show that there always exists a Markov perfect equilibrium, which can be of three types: accommodation, predation with no future entry, and predation with hit-and-run entry. We use the model to study alternative antitrust policies, derive the best rules for these policies, and compare their welfare effects.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9819

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Thema: predation ; accommodation ; entry ; legal rules ; Markov perfect equilibrium

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Rey, Patrick ; Spiegel, Yossi ; Stahl, Konrad O.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2022

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/263749
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ