Trade union membership and sickness absence: Evidence from a sick pay reform

Arbeitspapier

In 1996, statutory sick pay was reduced for private sector workers in Germany. Using the empirical observation that trade union members are dismissed less often than non-members, we construct a model to predict how absence behaviour will respond to the sick pay reform. We show that union members may have stronger incentives to be absent and to react to the cut in sick pay. In the empirical investigation, we find a positive relationship between trade union membership and absence due to sickness and observe more pronounced reactions to the cut in sick pay among union members than among non-members. These findings suggest that more flexibility in the use of paid absence due to sickness constitutes a private gain from trade union membership.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 07/2012

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects ; Time Allocation and Labor Supply
• Subject: difference-in-differences ; sickness-related absence ; Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) ; statutory sick pay ; trade union membership ; Lohnfortzahlung ; Reform ; Erwerbsunfähigkeit ; Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft ; Deutschland

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Goerke, Laszlo ; Pannenberg, Markus
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)
• (where): Trier
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80864
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET