Arbeitspapier
The Effects of Learning in Interactive Monetary Policy Committees
We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting behaviour.Therefore, and in contrast to earlier literature, we find that interaction is beneficial for the collective outcome.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-029/2
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
-
Monetary policy
interest rates
learning
Geldpolitik
Gruppenentscheidung
Lernen
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Berk, Jan Marc
Bierut, Beata K.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Berk, Jan Marc
- Bierut, Beata K.
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2004
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