Artikel

Monopolistic insurance and the value of information

The value of information regarding risk class for a monopoly insurer and its customers is examined in both symmetric and asymmetric information environments. A monopolist always prefers contracting with uninformed customers as this maximizes the rent extracted under symmetric information while also avoiding the cost of adverse selection when information is held asymmetrically. Although customers are indifferent to symmetric information when they are initially uninformed, they prefer contracting with hidden knowledge rather than symmetric information since the monopoly responds to adverse selection by sharing gains from trade with high-risk customers when low risks are predominant in the insurance pool. However, utilitarian social welfare is highest when customers are uninformed, and is higher when information is symmetric rather than asymmetric.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Risks ; ISSN: 2227-9091 ; Volume: 3 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 277-289 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
Thema
adverse selection
rent extraction
interim efficiency

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Snow, Arthur
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2015

DOI
doi:10.3390/risks3030277
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Snow, Arthur
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2015

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