Arbeitspapier
Firm-Specific Information and Explicit Collusion in Experimental Oligopolies
We experimentally study the effect of information about competitors actions on cartel stability and firms incentives to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized information is available and participants cannot communicate. In contrast, when communication is possible, results reverse: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe that the extra profits that firms obtain thanks to the possibility to communicate are higher when individualized information is present, suggesting that firms have greater incentives to form cartels in that situation.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 15-054/I
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Thema
-
Cournot oligopoly
Cartels
Information
Experiments
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gomez-Martin, Francisco
Onderstal, Sander
Sonnemans, Joep
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gomez-Martin, Francisco
- Onderstal, Sander
- Sonnemans, Joep
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2015
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