Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines whether government ideology has influenced monetary policy in OECD countries. We use quarterly data in the 1980.1-2005.4 period and exclude EMU countries. Our Taylor-rule specification focuses on the interactions of a new time-variant index of central bank independence with government ideology. The results show that leftist governments have somewhat lower short-term nominal interest rates than rightwing governments when central bank independence is low. In contrast, short-term nominal interest rates are higher under leftist governments when central bank independence is high. The effect is more pronounced when exchange rates are flexible. Our findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments, in an attempt to deflect blame of their traditional constituencies, have pushed market-oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1180

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Monetary Policy ; Central Banks and Their Policies ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
• Thema: Monetary policy ; Taylor rule ; government ideology ; partisan politics ; central bank independence ; panel data

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Belke, Ansgar ; Potrafke, Niklas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61407
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ