Arbeitspapier

Regulating the Environmental Consequences of Preferences for Social Status within an Evolutionary Framework

Taking as given that we are consuming too much and that overconsumption leads to environmental degradation, the present paper examines the regulator's choices between informative advertisement and consumption taxation. We model overconsumption by considering individuals that care about social status apart from the intrinsic utility, derived from direct consumption. We assume that there also exist individuals that care only about their own private consumption and we examine the evolution of preferences through time by allowing individuals to alter their behavior as a result of a learning process, akin to a replicator dynamics type. We consider the regulator's choice of consumption taxation and informative advertisement both in an arbitrary and an optimal control context. In the arbitrary overconsumption control context we find that the regulator could decrease, or even eliminate, the share of status seekers in the population. In the context of optimal overconsumption control, we show that the highest welfare is attained when status seekers are completely eliminated, while the lowest in the case that the entire population consists of status seekers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 34.2015

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Externalities
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Status-seaking
Replicator Dynamics
Information Provision
Environmental Taxation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sartzetakis, Eftichios S.
Xepapadeas, Anastasios
Yannacopoulos, Athanasios
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Sartzetakis, Eftichios S.
  • Xepapadeas, Anastasios
  • Yannacopoulos, Athanasios
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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