Evolutionary game analysis of government, businesses, and consumers in high-standard farmland low-carbon construction

Abstract: Soil is an important carbon reservoir, and high-standard farmland construction projects have significant potential to promote low-carbon development. In order to study the management and implementation of low-carbon production in high-standard farmland construction projects, the tripartite evolution game model of government, business, and consumer is constructed based on the tripartite bounded rationality. Then, the behavior strategy of tripartite stakeholders is analyzed with the method of system dynamics. Finally, the evolution process of tripartite interaction behavior is simulated using the MATLAB tool. The results show that: (1) The subsidy and punishment mechanism of the government must be aligned. In addition, the net income of government regulation is higher than the sum of the government’s environmental governance fees and fines of non-regulation; (2) The government, business, and consumers all choose their own behavioral strategies based on their own interests. (3) When the government’s environmental governance fee reaches a particular value, the system will appear imbalanced. In light of this, it is suggested that the government should increase support for business and use media publicity, consumer subsidies, and other measures to promote the consumption of low-carbon products. The business should constantly reduce the cost of carbon emission reduction through technological innovation.

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Evolutionary game analysis of government, businesses, and consumers in high-standard farmland low-carbon construction ; volume:16 ; number:1 ; year:2024 ; extent:13 ; Open Geosciences ; 16, Heft 1 (2024) (gesamt 13)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Dai, Yuting ; Liu, Jinbao ; Du, Yichun

Further information

• DOI: 10.1515/geo-2022-0593
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2024012713104552807390
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:23 AM CEST