Arbeitspapier

Credit claiming

We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who engage in team production. The public observes the organization's performance, but is unable to determine the separate contributions of the leader and of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the leader to claim credit (both truthfully and untruthfully), and the conditions which lead the leader to appoint a subordinate of low ability.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 458

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Thema
Leader
Credit claiming
asymmetric information
Equilibrium
Arbeitsgruppe
Führungsstil
Organisationstheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Glazer, Amihai
Segendorff, Björn
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Glazer, Amihai
  • Segendorff, Björn
  • Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)

Entstanden

  • 2001

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