Arbeitspapier

Credit claiming

We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who engage in team production. The public observes the organization's performance, but is unable to determine the separate contributions of the leader and of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the leader to claim credit (both truthfully and untruthfully), and the conditions which lead the leader to appoint a subordinate of low ability.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 458

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Subject
Leader
Credit claiming
asymmetric information
Equilibrium
Arbeitsgruppe
Führungsstil
Organisationstheorie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Glazer, Amihai
Segendorff, Björn
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
(where)
Stockholm
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Glazer, Amihai
  • Segendorff, Björn
  • Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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