Arbeitspapier
Credit claiming
We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who engage in team production. The public observes the organization's performance, but is unable to determine the separate contributions of the leader and of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the leader to claim credit (both truthfully and untruthfully), and the conditions which lead the leader to appoint a subordinate of low ability.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 458
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Subject
-
Leader
Credit claiming
asymmetric information
Equilibrium
Arbeitsgruppe
Führungsstil
Organisationstheorie
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Glazer, Amihai
Segendorff, Björn
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
- (where)
-
Stockholm
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Glazer, Amihai
- Segendorff, Björn
- Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
Time of origin
- 2001