Competitive Careers as a Way to Mediocracy

Arbeitspapier

We show that in competitive careers based on individual performance the least productive individuals may have the highest probabilities to be promoted to top positions. These individuals have the lowest fall-back positions and, hence, the highest incentives to succeed in career contests. This detrimental incentive effect exists irrespective of whether effort and talent are substitutes or complements in the underlying contest-success function. However, in case of complements the incentive effect may be be outweighed by a productivity effect that favors high effort choices by the more talented individual

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 25/2009

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing ; Public Sector Labor Markets ; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
• Thema: career competition ; contest ; mediocracy ; Erwerbsverlauf ; Wettbewerb ; Extensives Spiel ; Leistungsmotivation ; Arbeitsproduktivität ; Leistungsorientierte Vergütung ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kräkel, Matthias
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37036
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ