Theocracy and Resilience Against Economic Sanctions

Arbeitspapier

This paper provides a simply theory to explain the impact of sanctions on a regime's policies and behavior. Sanctions are generally put to strip the target country from its available rents and weaken the government's stance against growing discontent in the population. We show however that sanctions may give legitimacy to an incumbent government by influencing the optimal level of religious ideology provided by the state and further stabilizing its grip to power and rents. While in a good state of nature sanctions build resilience as long as religious ideology among the population is strong, at bad times they compel the target country to move towards ideological moderation. In a world of asymmetric information, the target country always finds it optimal to send an accurate signal in order to successfully convince the imposing side to lift sanctions and reach a win-win outcome.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 977

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Structure and Scope of Government: General ; Cultural Economics: Religion ; Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Naghavi, Alireza ; Pignataro, Giuseppe
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
• (wo): Bologna
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4108
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159815
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ