Sad, thus true: negativity bias in judgments of truth

Abstract: An effect observable across many different domains is that negative instances tend to be more influential than comparably positive ones. This phenomenon has been termed the negativity bias. In the current work, it was investigated whether this effect pertains to judgments of truth. That is, it was hypothesized that information valence and perceived validity should be associated such that more negative information is deemed more true. This claim was derived from the findings that negative instances tend to demand more attentional resources and that more elaborate processing can render messages more persuasive. In three experiments manipulating information valence through framing– and assessing judgments of truth – the hypothesized negativity bias was corroborated. Theoretical explanations and implications for further research are discussed

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Postprint ; begutachtet (peer reviewed) ; In: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology ; 45 (2009) 4 ; 983-986

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Psychologie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2009
• Creator: Hilbig, Benjamin E.

Further information

• DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.012
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-292118
• Rights: Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 25.03.2025, 1:52 PM CET