Arbeitspapier

The Comitology Game: European Policymaking with Parliamentary Involvement

This paper discusses institutional reforms that might strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the policymaking process of the European Union. Using simple game theory, the paper analyzes the working properties of the different implementation procedures that are known as 'comitology'. The Council of the European Union employs these procedures when it delegates some of its policymaking power to the Commission as part of Union legislation. We show how the balance of power is determined by the current comitology procedures, and how this balance would change if the role of the European Parliament were strengthened in the comitology game.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CSLE Discussion Paper ; No. 2000-05

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
Strategic power index
comitology
balance of power
Politische Entscheidung
Spieltheorie
Macht
Gewaltenteilung
Parlament
Theorie
EU-Politik
EU-Staaten

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Steunenberg, Bernard
Schmidtchen, Dieter
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
(wo)
Saarbrücken
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Steunenberg, Bernard
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter
  • Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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