Arbeitspapier
Income pooling and household division of labor: Evidence from Danish couples
If income pooling indicates primary earners' willingness to trade part of their income with spouses who earn less and work more in household production, then among specialized couples income pooling will be positively associated with the price of commercial domestic services, substitutes for household production. In line with our prediction, analyses of data from a unique Danish household survey show that complete income pooling is more frequent where commercial domestic services are more expensive.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5418
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
Household Saving; Personal Finance
Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
- Thema
-
home production
income pooling
household finance
domestic services
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina
Bonke, Jens
Grossbard, Shoshana
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina
- Bonke, Jens
- Grossbard, Shoshana
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2010
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