Second best environmental policies under uncertainty

Arbeitspapier

We construct a strategic trade model of an international duopoly, whereby production by exporting firms generates a local pollutant. Governments use environmental policies, i.e., an emissions standard or a tax, to control pollution and for rent shifting purposes. Contrary to their firm, however, governments are unable to perfectly foresee the actual level of demand, the cost of abatement and the damage caused from pollution. Under these modes of uncertainty we derive sufficient conditions under which the governments optimally choose an emissions tax over an emissions standard.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation ; Trade and Environment ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy
• Thema: Strategic Environmental Policy ; Pollution ; Choice of Policy Instrument ; Uncertainty ; Umweltpolitik ; Umweltbelastung ; Duopol ; Außenwirtschaftstheorie ; Ökosteuer ; Umweltauflage ; Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Antoniou, Fabio ; Hatzipanayotou, Panos ; Koundouri, Phoebe
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43441
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ