Arbeitspapier

Networks of many public goods with non-linear best replies

We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 57.2015

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Public Goods
Thema
Bipartite Graph
Public Good
Nash Equilibrium
Non-Linear
Complementarity Problem

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Rébillé, Yann
Richefort, Lionel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Rébillé, Yann
  • Richefort, Lionel
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2015

Ähnliche Objekte (12)