Arbeitspapier
Networks of many public goods with non-linear best replies
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 57.2015
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Public Goods
- Thema
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Bipartite Graph
Public Good
Nash Equilibrium
Non-Linear
Complementarity Problem
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Rébillé, Yann
Richefort, Lionel
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
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Milano
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Rébillé, Yann
- Richefort, Lionel
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2015