Arbeitspapier

Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investments and the Nature of the Incumbent Firm

In this paper we investigate tax/subsidy competition for FDI between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market. We investigate how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition between the two governments seeking to attract FDI. We show that the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare-maximizing firm, while its welfare may decrease when it is a private firm, as already shown by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006). We also show that, contrary to the case of a private domestic incumbent, a public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare-maximizer location. Finally, an efficiency-enhancing role of policy competition may only arise when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, while tax competition is always wasteful when the incumbent is a public firm.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni di Dipartimento ; No. 161

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Multinational Firms; International Business
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
Thema
Foreign Direct Investment
Tax/subsidy competition
Public firm
International mixed oligopoly

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Amerighi, Oscar
De Feo, Giuseppe
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Università degli Studi di Pavia, Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Metodi Quantitativi (EPMQ)
(wo)
Pavia
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Amerighi, Oscar
  • De Feo, Giuseppe
  • Università degli Studi di Pavia, Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Metodi Quantitativi (EPMQ)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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